Designing a Campaign Forbes' March to Ohio

Brigadier General John Forbes’ march from Carlisle to the Ohio River in 1758 was the first successful campaign in North America. Furthermore, it became one of the major operations during the Seven Years’ War that decided control of the continent in favor of the British at the expense of the French. Winston Churchill later referred to this conflict as the first global war. As such, this campaign is worthy of further study. This paper analyzes the Forbes campaign through the lens of the elements of operational design as explained in Joint Publication 5-0 to determine the reasons for success. It also looks to synthesize some of the lessons of the campaign to apply them to contemporary operations. While the definitions of the elements of operational design are adequate, they offer no historical examples so that a reader can grasp more fully their application. The Forbes campaign – a coalition operation conducted over more than 200 miles of wilderness that required significant planning and preparation - is an excellent case study in designing a successful campaign.

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March to Disaster Major General Edward Braddock and the Monongahela Campaign

This study posits that the leadership of Major General Edward Braddock led to the defeat of the force that he recruited, trained, and led against Fort Duquesne in July 1755. This thesis places Braddock into the strategic context of the time, seeks to highlight relevant leadership decisions he made that yield insights for today’s combat leaders. The defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela resulted in a torrent of Indian attacks that claimed many civilian lives and reduced colonial trust in Great Britain’s ability to defend her colonies. This engagement set the conditions that fostered within the colonists a growing mistrust of Great Britain and her colonial policies.

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Henry Bouquet A Study of Three Military Campaigns in North America, 1758-1764

Henry Bouquet, a professional Swiss officer, served in the British Army from 1756- 1765 in the 60th or Royal American Regiment. Bouquet's service to the Crown involved his participation in three major campaigns in North America. During 1758 Bouquet served as the second-in-command to Brigadier General John Forbes in an expedition to secure from the French Fort Duquesne, later renamed Fort Pitt. In 1763, Bouquet returned to Fort Pitt, personally organizing and leading the relief column which broke the Indian siege of that critical frontier installation during Pontiac's rebellion. This action resulted in the Battle of Bushy Run. In 1764, Bouquet conducted an expedition against the Delaware and Shawnee Indians in the Muskingum River Valley of Ohio. In this campaign he succeeded in ending Indian resistance in the region without having to fight in a single battle or engagement. Bouquet was a competent and professional military leader. This study evaluates Bouquet's three campaigns. It relates Bouquet's performance to leadership, warfighting and campaigning concepts outlined in modern military doctrine.

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Cultures in Conflict: As Assessment of Frontier Diplomacy during the French and Indian War

The French and Indian War of 1754-1763 was the fourth and final struggle for colonial dominance in North America. The long struggle for empire in North America between France and England began with King William's War (1689-97), followed by Queen Anne's War (17021713), King George's War (1744-1748), and finally the French and Indian War During each conflict, both the French and English enlisted Amerindian aid; however, the strategic objectives within each alliance were usually quite different. While the European powers warred over economics, trade, and territory, Native Americans agreed to enter each conflict "based on what they considered their best interests in protecting their territories, maintaining trade, or settling old inter-tribal scores. Cultural impacts on coalition warfare and differing strategic objectives among Amerindians and the European powers are the focus of this paper. Although the French and Indian War often found Europeans and Native Americans fighting alongside one another, expectations regarding strategic objectives, tactical objectives, and even concepts of operations for campaigns varied greatly. While the European powers, especially the French, recognized that different expectations and goals existed within coalitions involving Amerindians, they did not fully perceive the strategic implications that could result from the uncontrolled actions of native partners.

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The Illusion of Control: Great Powers Interacting with Tribal Societies and Weak Nation-States

Over the last 350 years, nation-states have interacted via international norms and institutions that were nurtured under the principles of Westphalian nation-statehood. In the aftermath of the Second World War (1939–1945), the U.S.-led West created an international system based upon the interactions of developed nation-states. New nation-states formed in colonial lands when their European overseers departed. These new nation-states tried to adhere to the Westphalian ideals, but many of them were nation-state in name only. The controlling entities were not the nationstate’s governing bodies; the controlling entities were the tribal societies beneath the surface. Great powers have continued to work with these hollow governments and/or tribal societies with little to no success. In order to achieve positive policy results, great powers must adjust their interactions and expectations when dealing with tribal societies and/or weak nation-states.

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Iroquois Confederacy's Experiences with Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces: A Historical Analysis

This book examines how the Iroquois Confederacy dealt with the centrifugal and centripetal forces it experienced in its over 300 year existence. Chapter one outlines an overall introduction to the subject. It also shows how important both centrifugal and centripetal forces were in influencing the Confederacy’s Center of Gravity (CoG). Chapter two tells how both centrifugal and centripetal forces worked within the Confederacy prior to the end of the French and Indian War (1763). Prior to 1763, centripetal forces acted as the dominant forces. Chapter three describes the changes that occurred between the two forces after 1763. Chapter four provides conclusions that explain the changes in dominance between the two forces.

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